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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
v. 
BIBEE GROCERY COMPANY, INCORPORATED. 
To the Honorable J'nstices of the Supreme Court of Appeals-
of Virg'inia: 
Your petitioner, the Commonwealth of Virginia, acting 
herei·n by the State Tax Commissioner, who is the proper 
officer designated by law to represent the Commonwealth of 
Virginia in such matters, respectfully represents that the 
judgment of the Corporation Court of the City of Lynch-
burg rendered on the 24th day of April, 1929, holding the 
Bibee Grocery Company, Incorporated to be not guilty of 
the charge of unlawfully prosecuting· the business, employ-
. ment and profession of operating a distributing house and 
place in this State (other than the house and place of manu-
facture) for the purpose of distributing goods, wares and 
merchandise among its retail stores without a license in vio-
lation of Section 136 and Section 188 of the Tax Code of 
·Virginia, is erroneous. A transcript of the record of the 
proceedings in this cause and of the _judgment herein is here-
with exhibited. 
Your petitioner represents that she is aggrieved by the 
said judgment in the following particulars, namely: 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS. 
I. 
The Court erred in holding the last paragraph of Section 
188 of the Tax Code of Virginia to be unconstitutional. 
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II. 
The. court erred in holding the Bibee Grocery Company, 
Incorporated, not guilty of the charge of having unlawfully 
operated a distributing house and place in this State (other 
than the house and place of manufacture) for the purpose of 
distributing goods, wares and merchandise among its retail 
stores without a license in violation of Section 136 and sec-
tion 188 of the Tax Code of Virginia. · 
The secqnd .assignment of error is e1itirely dependent upon 
the validity of the first assignment and argument will be 
confined entirely to the first _assignment. 
JURISDICTION. 
While this is a criminal proceeding in which the defend-
ant in error was adjudged to be not guilty, yet your petitioner 
is entitled to a writ of error by virtue of Section 4931 of the 
Code of Virginia inasmuch as the said defendant in error 
was charged with the violation ·of a law relating to the State 
revenue. Section 4931 of the Code of Virginia reads as fol-
lows: · 
"A writ of error shall lie in a criminal case to the judg-
ment of a circuit court or the judge thereof, or of a corpo-
rat:on court, from the Supreme Court of Appeals. It shall 
lie in any such. case £or the accused, and if the case be for 
the violation of law relating to the State revemt,e, it shalt 
lie also for the Commonwealth." (Italics supplied.) 
See Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Virginia 805. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
\Vhile the facts in the case were agreed to by a stipulation 
made a part of the record, for the sake of clarity they will 
be summarized here. 
Bibee Grocery Company, Incorporated, a. Virginia corpo-
ration doing business as a merchant, operates seven retail 
.grocery stores in Lynchburg and vicinity. During the year 
1928 the company leased a warehouse at 922 Jefferson Street 
from which warehouse the company distributed goods pur-
chased. by it for sale in its retail stores among such stores. 
No goods are sold directly from the warehouse, this place 
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of business being maintained solely as a distributing point. 
Each store is charged with the goods distributed to it from 
the warehouse, the records of such distributions being kept 
both at the store and the warehouse. 
The compai1y has paid all license taxes assessed on account 
of the operation of its several retail stores, but refused to 
apply for a 1929 license for the operation of its distributing 
warehouse and to pay the tax prescribed by law. Upon com-
plaint of D. L. Taylor, Commissioner of Revenue for the City 
of Lynchburg, of the failure of the company to comply with 
the law as aforesaid this proceeding was instituted. The 
company was found guilty in the Municipal Court of Lynch-
burg, and upon appeal to the Corporation Court the judg-
ment complained of was ·rendered. 
PRINCIPLE. CONTENDED FOR BY THE 
OOMM·ONWEALTH. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has the. constitutional 
right to require of a merchant a license and impose a tax for 
the privilege of maintaining and operating a distributing 
house or place in this State (other than the house or place 
of manufacture) for the purpose of distributing goods; wares 
and merchandise among his .or its retail stores, and the last 
paragraph of Section 188 of the Tax Code of Virginia do~ 
not deprive any person or corporation of any right guaran-
teed by the Constitutions of Virginia and of the United 
States. 
ARGUMENT. 
Nature and Purpose of the Tax. 
It should be stated at the outset that the tax complained of. 
is a revenue measure. Section 188 of the Tax Code of Vir-
ginia is the statute imposing upon merchants the tax which 
corresponds to and is in lieu of the tax that a manufacturer 
pays on capital. The General Assembly of 19·28 amended this 
section by adding the pa.ragraph involved in this proceeding. 
It reads as follows : 
"For every distributing house or place in this State (other 
than the house or place of manfacture) operated by any per-
son, :firm or corporation engaged in the bus~ness of a merchant 
in this State, for the purpose of distributing goods, wares 
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and merchandise among his or its retail stores, a separate 
merchant's license shall be required, and the goods, wares 
and merchandise distributed through such distributing house 
or place shall he regarded as purchases for the purpose of 
measuring the license tax. '' 
In this era of consolidation and centralization of busi-
ness operations that institution known as the "co.rner store" 
is fast disappearing. Numbers or stores are being grouped 
and operated under one management. These groups vary 
in the number of component parts from two to probably 
thousands. They will be found to be operated by individ-
uals and corporations, both foreign and domestic. A natural 
outgrowth of this trend, in the -interest of efficiency and 
economy, was the establishment of warehouses as points from: 
which goods for sale in the various stores were distributed. 
These warehouses range from small places to serve a few 
stores, as in the instant case, to enormous centers from which 
hundreds are served. Until 1928 a license was only re-
quired of each retail store. The General Assembly ap-
.parently recognizing the tremendous increase in the number 
of such distributing warehouses and the potential sources 
of large revenue (and for other reasons to. be mentioned) 
required a license for the operation of such warehouse, the 
tax to be measured by the value of the goods distributed. 
The tax has proved a souree of considerable revenue the 
amount probably to increase annually. 
It will be observed that a specific license is required for 
doing a definite thing. There is no connection between this 
license and that required for operating a retail store. The 
two licenses are separate and distinet, one is required for 
operating a distributing house and the other is required for 
operating a retail store. 
. In short the General Assembly has made -a separate classi-
fication, for purposes of taxation, of distributing houses as 
defined by the statute. This action is in line with the recog-
nized legislative practice in the classification of business and 
professions for purposes of license taxation. It ·will rarely be 
found that legislatures take notice of· a new business, or pro-
fession, for the first few years, but when such business or 
profession developes to an appreciable extent the legislature 
will classify it, where it is a proper subject, for license taxa-
tion. For example, the last (1928) General Assembly of Vir-
ginia made at least two other new classifications of busi-
ness subject to license taxation, Installment Paper HandJers 
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or Dealers, (Section 181 A of the Tax Code of Virginia) and 
.Wholesale Merchandise .brokers Who :::)ell Only to Whole-
salers or Manufacturers ( ~ection 171 A of the ~tax Code). 
'l'he Report of the Commission to Revise, Uoliate, l::;im-
plify and uod..fy the General Tax Laws of Virginia, published 
tRS Senate Documents ·l'J o. 7 by the General Assembly of 
1928, which _may be taken to indicate the intention of the· 
General Assembly, says-of this statute at page 19: 
''The last paragraph of Section 188 is ilew and is intended 
.to equalize the tax burden as between the operator of many 
,retail places of business on the one hand and the operator 
of only one retail place of business on the other. In the 
former class of cases, the merchant usually has a distribut-
ing warehouse and only pays on his purchases when the pur-
chases are distributed among his retail store as purchases 
· for such stores. In the latter class of cases, that is, the mer-
chant who has only one place of business, or the merchant 
who has no distributing warehouse, the merchant buys from 
the regular wholesalers in this State, which wholesalers pay 
the regular taxes measured by their purchases, so that when 
the goods reach the consumer, two taxes have been collected, 
one from the wholesaler and one from the retailer. The 
failure of the law to require a separate merchant's license 
'for every distributing house or place· in this State (other 
than the house or place of manufacture) operated by any 
person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of a 
merchant in tlii,s State, for the purpose of distributing goods, 
wares and merchandise among his or its retail stores'-
operates to place the chain store merchant ·at a marked ad-
vantage ·over the ordinary retail merchant, and enables the 
chain store merchant to undersell the ordinary retail mer-
chant, certainly to the extent of the additional taxes which 
the ordinary retail merchant must pass on to the consumer. 
The commission regards the existing law on this subject as 
unfair, and as giving the chain store an advantage over the 
regular wholesaler and retailer. It should be remembered 
that the reason why the regular wholesaler and retailer are 
put to th¢. dis·advantage is t;b.at the "joint tax burden on them 
is heavier, and that all of the people of the State benefit by 
reason Of the additional taxes paid by such· regular whole-
saler and retailer.'' 
Thus it will be seen that in additiort to the revenue fea~ 
tures of the statute, it represented a definite poHcy of taxa-
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tion on the part of the General-Assembly, that is "to equal-
ize the tax burden''. 
CONSTITUTIQN!.l.,ITY OF TilE S'rATUTJ;n. 
The statute deprives Il.O person or corporation of any 
right guaranteed by the Constitution of Virginia or of th~ 
United States. The judgment of the lower court does not 
specify wherein the statute is repugnant to either constitu-
tion. However, it is reasonable to assume that inasmuuch as 
the statute represents a classification for purposes of taxa-
tion, if such classification be unconstitutional, it must be 
repugnant to either Section 168 of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia or to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
AJI1endment to the Constitution of the United States. 
There can be no question of double taxation raised (even 
were there a constitutional inhibition against double taxation) 
for a license tax is not a property tax. Cooley on Taxa-
tion, 4th Ed., Section 269. In Virginia it is well settled that 
the provisions of the Constitution (Section 168) requiring 
eqtiality and uniformity of taxa,tion apply only to a direct tax 
on property, and not to license taxes which do not always 
admit of a tax equal and uniform. 
See Bradley v. Richmond, 110 Virginia 521, 66 S. E. 872. 
Pocahontas Collierif}s Co. v. Com:monwealth, 113 Virginia 
108, 73 S. E. 446. 
It follows that the real question involved' is whether or 
not the classification made by the General Assembly is a 
reasonable one within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
visions. · · 
REASONABLENESS OF CLASSIFICATION. 
The license tax is required of all merchants for the oper-
ation of a "distributing house or place * *' * for the 
purpose of distributing goods, wares and merchandise among 
his or its retail stores''. Every merchant doing business in 
Virginia who distributes merchandise among his stores 
through a central distributing house is required to pay a li-
cense tax for that privilege. It is immaterial whether he op-
erates two stores or two hundred,-no exception is made; all 
embraced in the classification are included. Therefore, all 
are treated alike in obdience to the rule that has been so 
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often laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
most recently in Bart vs. Harmon (1929)-U. S.-) 49 Sup. 
Ct. 188, where Mr. Justice Sutherland said: 
"Nor is the imposition of an excise tax upon one occu-
pation or one activity from which other and different occu-
pations or activities are exempt, a denial of equal protec-
. tion. It is enough if all in the same class are included and 
treated alike. These propositions are so firmly established 
by repeated decisions of this court that further discussion 
is unnecessary.'' 
In addition to the requ;_site that all shall be treated alike, 
the classification must also be reasonable. That the powers 
of the Legislature in selecting and classifying subjects of tax-
ation are very broad cannot be questioned. The general rule 
is well expressed by Mr. Justice Van DeVanter in Oliver Iron 
Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526, 529: 
"The Legislature of the State may exercise a wide dis-
cretion in selecting the subjects of taxation, particularly as 
respects occupation taxes. It may select those who are en-
gaged in one class of business and exclude others, if all . 
similarly situated are brought within the class and all mem-
bers of the class are dealt with according to uniform rules." 
The reported cases are almost without limit. A few are 
discussed as setting out the general principles which should 
he applied here. · 
In Bmdley v. Richmond, supra. the City of Richmond levied 
a license tax aga;nst private bankers by which some private 
bankers were put into a class which subjected them to less 
taxation than others. The class discriminated against al-
leged that the classifi.ca tion was illegal. Judge Harrison, 
at page 526, speaking for the court, declared that: 
"It was competent for the council to assig11 private bank-
ers to different classes, and the plaintiff i11 error was re- · 
quired to pay no greater license tax than all others in the 
same class with himself. In order to render the classifica-
tion illegal, the party assailing it must show that the busi-
ness discriminated against is precisely the same as that in-
cluded in the class which is alleged to be favored. This has 
not been shown in the present case. On the contrary, it ap-
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pears that the business of the plaintiff in error is not pre-
cisely the same with that of other private bankers who are 
put in a different class and assessed with a less license tax." 
The tax was upheld and this case went to the Supreme 
Court of the United States (227 U. S. 477, 33 Sup. Ct. 31~, 
320), 'vhere it was said in affirming the opinion of the state-
ment: 
"That some private bankers were put into classes which 
subjected them to less taxation than the class into which 
the plaint~ff in error was placed is the only allegation which 
would tend to show discrimination. But there was evidence 
tending to show that the business clone by the plaintiff in 
error and ten other persons or firms was that of lending 
money at high rates upon salaries and household furniture, 
while the kind of business done by the others in the same 
general business was the lending of money upon commer-
cial securities. Obviously the burden was upon the plain-
tic in error to show an illegal and capricious classification. 
The State court said that he had failed to show that these 
private bankers favored in the classification were doing the 
same business.'' 
A case illustrating and pointing out the limits to which 
a State may go in respect to classification is that of Heisler v. 
Thom.as Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup, Ct. 83, 84. The 
Comonwealth of Pennsylvania levied a tax against anthra-
cite coal omitting to tax bituminous coal. The equal protec-
tion clause was asserted to be violated by the discrimination. 
In upholding the tax on the ground that the classification 
was proper, the following principles were announced: 
"And so classification has uses in government-indeed, 
we may say, necessitates in government, for government 
as well as persons has purposes, varied and, at times, 
exigent, and its legislation must be accommodated to 
them, either in convenience or necessity. That gov-
ernment has the power to do so we have often pro-
nounced, not, however, omitting to recognive the re-
straints upon the power while expressing its range and 
adaptation. In its exercise in taxation, we have said, it is 
competent for a .State to exempt certain kinds of pro:gerty 
and tax others, the t·estrain.ts ~~pon it only being against 
(clear and hostile disc1·iminations a;ga.in.st partvoular per-
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sons and classes'. D-iscriminations merely are not inhibited 
for, it was recognized, that there are discriminations which 
the best interests of society require." (Italics supplied.) 
* * * * * * * * * 
"Any classifisation is permissible which has a reasonable 
relation to some permitted end of governmental action. 
* * * * It is enough, for instance, if the classification 
is reasonably founded in 'the purposes and policy of taxa-
tion'." 
"In other cases it is said that facts which can he rea-
sonably conceived of as having existed when the law was 
enacted will be assumed to justify it. Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbon,ic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78, 31 Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 
369, Ann Ca. 1912 C, 160; Cresent Oil Co. ·v. Mississippi, 257 
U. S. 129, 137, 42 Sup. Ct. 42, 66 L. Ed. 166." 
"And it makes no difference that the facts may be dis-
puted or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of 
serious . strength. It is not within the competency of the 
courst to arbitrate in such contrariety.'' Rast v. Van De-
1nan & Lewis, 240 U. S. 342, 357, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 L. Ed. 
679, L. R. A. 1917 A, 421 Ann Ca. 1917 B, 455, and cases 
there cited" 
"And, htrtl~er,. the purpose of the legislation may not be 
the correction of so1ne definite evil, b'ut may be only to re-
move 'obstacles to a greater public welfare'." 
It is particularly interesting to note that discriminations 
are not inhibited, in fact sometimes the "best interests of 
society require" them, but that the discriminations must be 
"clear and hostile discriminations against particular per-
sons and classes". And it is further said to be "enough if 
the classification is reasonably fo~mded in the purpose and 
policy of taxat,ion". The reason for, and the policy of the 
legislation in imposing the tax as heretofore set out, is of the 
greatest importance in applying the doctrine laid down in this 
case. 
Heisler ·v. Thomas Colliery Co., S'Upra., quoted with ap-
proval from Rast v. Deman d/; Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 242, 36 
Sup. Ct. 370, 374. This was a case involving a statute by 
"-'--""-.._ 
___ "_--'--.~ 
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which a license tax was imposed upon merchants, druggists 
and storekeepers, and an additional license tax was imposed 
upon those merchants, druggists and storekeepers who of-
fered with merchandise coupons or profit sharing certifi-
eates. It was also claimed here that the classification was ar-
bitrary and unreasonable. The court, in upholding this stat-
ute, said: 
''The ground of discrimination, simply and separated from 
the other attacks upon the statute, does not present much 
difficulty. The difference between a business where coupons 
are used, even regarding their use as a means of. advertis-
ing, and a business where they are not used, is pronounced. 
Complainants are at pains to display it. The legislation 
which regards the difference is not arbitrary within the rul-
ings of the cases. It is established that a distinction in legis-
lation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts reasonably can 
be conceived that would sustain it, and the existence of that 
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be as-
sumed. It makes no difference that the facts may be dis-
puted or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of 
serious strength. It is not within the competency of the 
courts to arbitrate in such contrariety. 
It is the duty and function of the legislature to discern 
and correct evils, and by evils we do not mean some definite 
injury, but obstacles to a great public welfare. And, we re-. 
peat 'it may make discriminations if founded on distinctions 
that we cannot pronounce unreasonable and purely arbi-
trary'.'' 
The comparatively recent case of Armour cf; Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 118 Va. 242, 87 S. E. 610, which went to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, 246· U. S. 1, 38 Sup. Ct. 
267, 269, is quite similar, so far as principles of classification 
are concerned, to the case at bar. It will be remembered 
that for the purposes of the license tax Virginia made a dis-
tinction between a manufacturer selling goods at the place 
of manufacture and one selling goods at a place other than 
that of manfacture, imposing no merchant's license in the 
one case and requiring a license in the other. That Court 
said: 
"The trial court enjoined the enforcement of the statute 
to the extent complained of and its action on appeal was re-
versed by the court below. It was held that the statute was 
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inherently within the State legislative power and that the 
difference between a manufacturer selling goods .by him 
made at the place where . they were manufactured and one 
engaged in a mercantile business even if his business con-
sisted in whole or in part of the selling of goods by him manu-
factured at a place other than the place of manufacture was 
such as to afford adequate ground for their distinct classifi-
catioil and hence justified the provision of the statute includ-
ing oh€) in the merchant's license and excluding the other. 
In addition, construing the statute, it was decided that it was 
not discriminatory since the exclusion from the license tax 
of manufacturers selling at their place of manufac-
ture was open to all, whether noncitizens or even non-
residents who manufactured in Virginia and because the 
liability for the merchant's license embraced even those who 
manufactured in Virginia if they sold as merchants the goods 
by the¢ manufactured at a place other than the place of 
manufacture. From this latter conclusion it was decided that 
if any disadvantages resulted to the person selling as a mer-
chant in Virginia goods manufactured by him in another 
State by subjecting him to a license when such license did not 
include the manufacturer selling in Virginia at the place 
of manufacture, the disadvantage was a mere indirect con-
sequence of a lawful and non-discriminatory exercise of 
State authority and afforded no basis for holding the statute 
to be repugnant to the clauses of the Constitution of the 
United States as contended." 
In the late Virgii1ia case of McKenney v. Alexandria, 147 
Virginia 157 Judge Chichester, speaking of classification for 
the purpose of license taxation, said at page 162: 
''The general rule, so far as class1fication of business for 
the purpose of taxation is coneerned, is that trades, occupa-
tions, professions and privileges may be classified for pur-
poses of license or occupation taxes, and different licenses 
may be imposed upon the various classes, provided the classi-
fication is reasonable. 37 C. J., page 198, Section 52, and cases 
cited. · Note 24, including a number of Virginia cases. Gen-
em;l classes may be subdivided into pa,rticular classes and 
licensed or taxed." (Italics Supplied.) 
and again at page 164: .. ·, 
''The discrimination between classes, in order to avoid the 
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pitfalls of unconstitutionality, must rest upon some reason-
able ground of difference which has some relation to the busi-
ness or occupation. The tax must hear equally and uniformly 
upon all persons engaged in· the same class of business.'' 
In the light of these cases it is respectfully submitted that 
the selection of these distributing houses as the subject of a 
license tax is reasonable and justified. The purpose of the 
statute is to raise revenue, to equalize the tax burden, to es-
tablish a definite policy of taxation and not to arbitrarily or in 
a hostile manner discriminate. There is no exception to 
the operation of the statute. 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
While it is believed that the cases and principles discussed 
amply justify the classification the burden is not U£lon the 
Commonwealth to show that a statute does not violate any 
constitutional provision. As was said in Albemarle Ou Co. 
v. Morris, 138 Virginia 1, at page 7: 
''In doubtful cases, the limitation, by a State Constitution 
of the power of the legislature is to be strictly construed, 
and the courts should resolve all doubts in favor of the con· 
stitutionality of the act. Every possible presumption is in 
favor of the validity of the act until overcome beyond all 
reasonable doubt.'' 
and also at page 11: 
I 
"While the courts can pass upon the constitutionality of 
legislative enactment, they cannqt overthrow legislative de-
termination of the existence of conditions with respect to its 
own procedure, or the existence of conditions satisfying it 
of the propirety of its action.'' 
The burden of proving that a tax statute is unconstitutional 
is upon the party alleging unconstitutionality. Postal Tele-
graph & Cable Co. v. Norfolk, 118 Virginia 455. 
SUMMARY. 
1. The statute is a revenue statute and is founded in the 
purpose and policy of taxation. 
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2. All in the classification are included and treated alike. 
3. A reasonable basis exists for the classification. 
4. The burden of proving that a tax statute is unconsti-
tutional is upon the party alleging unconstitutionality. 
5. The judgment complained of is, therefore, erroneous. 
And your petitioner further represents that the said judg-
ment is in other respects uncertain, informal and erroneous. 
Yqur petitioner, therefore, prays that a writ of error and 
S1tpersedeas may be awarded her, in order that the said 
judgment, for the causes of error aforesaid, before you may 
be caused to come, that the whole matter in the said judg-
ment contained may be reheard, and that the judgment may 
be reversed and annulled. 
STATE TAX COMMISSIONER, 
By W. W. MARTIN, 
HENRY R. MILLER, Jr., Counsel. 
Rec'd May 29, 1929. 
RH.L.C. 
I, W. W. Martin, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do herehy certify that in my 
opinion there is error in the judgment entered on the 24th 
day of April, 1929, in the Corporation Court of the City of 
Lynchburg, Virginia, in favor of Bibee Grocery Company, 
Incorporated, against the Commonwealth o.f Virginia, as 
set forth in the foregoing petition, for which the same 
should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia. 
W. W. MARTIN, Attorney. 
Virginia: 
In the Supreme Court of Appeals, held at the Court House 
of Wythe County, in the Town of Wytheville, on Tuesday 
the 11th day of June, 1929: 
Upon the petition of the Commonwealth of Virginia, acting 
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by the State Tax Commission, a writ of error is allowed and 
supersedeas awarded to the judgment of the corporation 
court of the City of Lynchburg, rendered on the 24th day of 
April, 1929, in the cause then therein depending wherein the 
Commonwealth of Virginia was plaintiff and Bibee Grocery 
Company, Incorporated, was defendant. 
A Copy-Teste: · 
J. M. KELLY, Clerk. 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Frank P. Christian, Judge 
. of the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg at 
the court house thereof on the 25th day of April, A. D., 
1929, and in the 153rd year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: on the first 
day of the April term, 1929, of the corporation court for 
the city of Lynchburg the appeal in the case of Common-
wealth against Bibee Grocery Co., Inc., noted by the defend-
ant before the assistant judge of the municipal court for 
the city of Lynchburg, was docketed in said corporation 
court. 
The warrant and the judgment of the assistant judge of 
the municipal court thereon are in the words and figures fol-
lowing, to-wit: 
page 2 ~ Virginia: 
City of Lynchburg To-wit: 
To aU or any of the Police of said City: 
Whereas D. L.-Taylor of said city has, this day made com-
plaint, on oath, before me, Jos. P. McCarron, Ass't Judge 
Municipal Court of said city, that Bibee Grocery Co., Inc., 
on the - day of March, 1929 did in said city unlawfully 
operate a wholesale distributing business without obtaining 
a state license. 
These are therefore to Command You, in the name of the 
Commonweath, forthwith to apprehend the said Bibee Gro-
cery Co., Inc. and bring it before me, or some Justice of said 
Commonwealth v. Bibee Grocery Company, Inc.. 15 
city, to answer the said complaint, and to be further d~alt 
with according to law. 
Given under my and this 9th day of March, 1929. 
Virginia: 
City of Lynchburg, to-wit: 
JOS. P. McCARRON, 
Ass 't Judge. 
Be it remembered, that on the 6th day of March; 1929, Bi-
bee Grocery Go., Inc., brought before me, Judge of Munici-
pal Court for the City of Lynchburg, charged with a misde-
meanor in this that it did in said city operate a wholesale 
distributing business without obtaining a state license as 
charged in within warrant, was by me, upon the evidence, 
on oath of D. L. Taylor found guilty of said offense, where-
fore I adjudge that it pay a fine of $10.00 & 1:.25 costs. 
JOS. P. McCARRON, 
Ass 't Judge. 
But the said Bibee Grocery Go., Inc. having prayed an 
appeal from my said judgment, an appeal is hereby granted 
to the next term of the Corporation Court of L,ynchburg, and 
the said judgment and conviction, as well as the said ap-
peal is hereby certified to said Court. 
Given under my hand and seal this - day of March, 1929. 
JOS. P. McCARRON, 
Ass 't Judge. 
page 3 ~ And at this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corpora-
tion Court April 25th, 1929, the day and year first 
hereinbefore mentioned. 
This 24th day of April, 1929, came the parties by their re-
spective attorneys, and the defendant, Bibee Grocery Com-
pany, Incorporated, acting by J. W. Bibee, its president, who 
appeared personally in court, entered its plea of not guilty 
to the warrant herein, and the said parties by their respec-
tive attorneys agreed that all matters of law and fact in-
volved in the cause should be submitted to the court with-
16 Supreme Court of A.ppectls of Virginia. 
out the intervension of a jury and prayed leave to file as a 
part of the record of the cause an agreed statement of facts, 
which leave being granted the same was accordingly filed. 
Upon consideration whereof, and after argument of coun-
sel, the com::t being of opinion that the last paragraph of 
Section 188 of the Tax Code of Virginia is unconstitutional, 
and it appearing to the court from the warrant and said 
agreed statement of facts herein that, the defendant is 
charged with having unlawfully prosecuted the business, em-
ployment and profession of operating a distributing house 
and place in this State· (other than the house and place of 
manufacture) for the purpose of distributing goods, wares 
and merchandise among its retail store without a license in 
violation of Section 136 and .Section 188 of the Tax Code of 
Virginia. 
I~ is hereby Ordered and Adjudged that, by reason of the 
unconstitutionality of the last paragraph of Secti·on 188 of 
the Tax Code of Virgi1iia, the defendant is not guilty of said 
charge and the Code of Virginia, the defendant is not guilty 
of said charge and the warrant in this cause be and the same 
is hereby dismissed and the defendant do go hence without 
day. To all of which action of the court the Gommonwealth 
of. Virginia by its attorney .excepted and prayed that its ex-
ception be noted of record, which is accordingly done. 
And the Commonwealth of Virginia by its attorney having 
. indicated its purpose to apply to the Supreme 
page 4 ~ Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error 
and supersedeas to this judgment, it is further or-
dered that the judgment be and the same is hereby suspended 
for a period of sixty days from the date of the entry hereof. 
The agreed statement of facts, referred to in the foregoing· 
order is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
page 5 ~ STIPULATION· OF FACTS. 
· · It is hereby agreed and stipulated that the facts in the 
above entitled cause are as follows: 
. The Bibee Grocery Company is a corporation incorporated 
under the laws of Virginia and doing business as a merchant 
in Virginina. · 
Commonwealth v. Bibee Grocery Company, Inc. 17 
_ In 1927 the Bibee Grocery Company opened up a retail 
grocery store in the City of Lynchburg, and has from time to 
time since that time opened up and operated other stores for 
retail business in the said city. Prior to January 1, 1929, the 
Bibee Grocery Company began operating one retail store as 
a merchant in Madison Heights, Virginia and one in Altavista, 
Virgina. The company is now operating in all seven retail 
grocery stores. · 
The Bibee Grocery Company, for convenience and effi-
ciency, leases a warehouse at 922 Jefferson Street in the City 
of Lynchburg, which is situated on a railroad side track, from 
which warehouse some, but not all, goods purchased by the 
company for sale in its retail stores are distributed among 
such retail stores. No ,goods are sold directly from the ware-
house and no revenue derived from its operation other than 
to the extent that the maintenance and operation of such 
warehouse enables the company to more conveniently and 
efficiently conduct its business operations as a merchant. 
Goods are not sold by the warehouse to the respective retail 
stor-es but distributions of goods are made from time to time 
from the warehouse to the respective retail stores, as such 
distributions are needed to replenish their stocks. 
Each sto're keeps its own separate books charging itself 
with the goods received from the warehouse at cost merely 
for the purpose of accurate accounting. The record of the 
distributions among the several retail stores are also kept at 
the warehouse. The net profit or loss on sales by each store 
is aceounted for to the company. The company makes one 
purchase of its goods and one sale. 
License tax has been paid by the company for each retail 
store operating during the year 1928, the said license tax be-
ing measured by the amount of goods, ware and merchandise 
received for sale at each of said retail stores. 
On the 6th day of March, 1929, the-Bibee Grocery Com-
pany, Inc. was fined $10.00 in the Munieipal Court in the City 
of Lynchburg on account of its failure to obtain within the 
time prescribed by law a State license for the operation of 
aforesaid warehouse maintained for the purpose of distribut-
ing goods, wares and merchandise among its retail stores. 
There are some merchants operating a single retail store in 
Lynchburg and also maintaining a warehouse for storage and 
delivery of goods, wares and merchandise, who have not ap-
plied for a license for operating a distributing house for 
the purpose of distributing goods, ware and merchandise 
among their retail stores, and no license tax has been assessed 
18 ~upreme Court of Appod1s of Virginia.· 
against such merchants for operating a warehouse for de-
livery to a single retail store. 
·. 
F. P. CHRISTIAN, Jr., 
Counsel for Bibee Grocery Company, Inc. 
W. W. MARTIN, 
.Counsel for Commonwealth of Virginia. 
page 7 ~ I, Hubert, H. Martin, clerk of the corporation 
court for the city of Lynchburg, hereby certify that 
. the foregoing is a true transcript of the record in the case 
of Commonwealth of Virginia vs. ·Bibee Grocery Co., Inc., 
and I further certify that notice as required by Section 6339 
of the Code has been duly given as appears by a paper 
writing :filed with the record in said case. 
The clerk's fee for making the foregoing transcript is 
$3.50. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of May, 1929 .. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. STEWART JONES, C. C. 
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